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Abstract
Reforms aiming at lowering the tax burden and cutting social benefits may boost efficiency
and output, and improve market adjustment to shocks, but, by reducing the size of automatic
stabilisers, may also imply less cyclical smoothing. This would be problematic in EMU given
the loss of national monetary autonomy. This paper argues that the alleged trade-off between
efficiency/flexibility and stabilisation depends on the typology of shocks affecting the
economy. While higher taxes and benefits stabilise output in the event of demand shocks, if
the initial tax burden is high, they may have destabilising effects in the event of supply
shocks. As to inflation, very high taxes are destabilising thereby increasing the likelihood of a
policy conflict with the central bank. Numerical simulations show that European countries –
especially very open ones – may well have a tax burden above the threshold beyond which
perverse output stabilisation effects in the event of supply shocks occur. Hence tax reforms
may not only improve efficiency, but, if supply shocks prevail, also enhance cyclical
stabilisation.
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1. Introduction
Taxation inevitably impinges on most aspects of economic activity, and thus careful
consideration must be given to its design — in addition to its level and hence the level
of related expenditure. So long as taxation affects incentives it may alter economic
behaviour of consumers, producers or workers in ways that reduce the amount or
utilisation of physical, human and knowledge capital, and thus growth. Therefore, to
the extent the tax system matters for economic efficiency, its costs are likely to rise
with the level of taxation. The widespread perception that in many European countries
the tax burden is too high and the tax system unduly distortive has led to calls for tax
reforms. Empirical research suggests that a cut in the tax share in GDP by 1
percentage point raises output per working-age person in the long run by 0.6 to 0.7
per cent (OECD, 2000).
While policy makers’ efforts to streamline the welfare state and enact tax reforms that
aim to bringing down the tax burden may thus pay off in terms of better efficiency,
this may come at a cost in terms of weaker fiscal automatic stabilisation. This trade
off between stabilisation and efficiency would be particularly unpalatable in EMU
countries, since they already have lost national monetary policy and the exchange rate
as adjustment mechanisms to country-specific shocks. Indeed, EMU members would
ideally aim for both stronger fiscal stabilisation and higher economic efficiency, and a
trade-off between the two would be quite unwelcome. 
Fortunately, this difficult trade-off may not always be relevant. In other papers (Buti
et al., 2003a and b) we have shown that here may be a level of the tax burden beyond
which reducing it may not only yield better efficiency, but, depending of the nature of
economic shocks, also render fiscal automatic stabilisers more effective. If supply
shocks tend to prevail, a reduction in the tax burden might carry a “double dividend”
of efficiency gains and better fiscal stabilisation properties. This conclusion draws on
evidence that lower taxation improves the terms of the short-run inflation-
unemployment trade off (i.e. makes the Phillips curve flatter) by reducing the wedge
between the marginal cost of labour and the marginal take-home pay. This is2
encouraging for countries with high tax burdens that are considering a reduction in the
size of the public sector.
The present paper takes this analysis further, by introducing a distinction between the
"optimal" tax burden at which, under supply shocks, the automatic stabilisers are most
powerful and beyond which favourable stabilisation properties decline, and a
"critical" tax burden beyond which stabilisation properties become perverse. Beyond
the latter point, taxes and benefits have destabilising effects on output in the event of
supply shocks and destabilising effects on inflation in the event of supply and demand
shocks, thereby increasing the likelihood of a policy conflict with the central bank.
Numerical simulations show that several euro area countries – especially the very
open ones – may well have a tax burden above this critical level, while most countries
will have a tax burden that exceeds the "optimal" level. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, a model of wage setting incorporating
the effect of taxes is developed. The basic mechanisms are then incorporated in
section 3 in simple macroeconomic model to analyse the stabilising effects of
taxation. In section 4, the two concepts of “threshold” tax rates are derived. Section 5
provides some numerical simulations of such tax rates. The final section concludes.  
2. A model of wage setting with wage resistance 
The basic tenet of this paper is that automatic stabilisers operate not only on the
demand side through their impact on disposable income, but also on the supply side
through their impact on ex ante profitability. Distortionary taxes and benefits affect
the level of equilibrium unemployment and potential output
1. What is important in our
analysis, however, is the impact of distorting taxes and benefits on the reaction of
aggregate supply to unexpected inflation, that is the slope – not the position - of the
aggregate supply curve. 
We assume that workers pass through the cyclical variations in their tax burden at
least partly onto employers. This implies that there is “real wage resistance” in an
                                                
1 See, e.g. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (1999), Van den Noord and Heady (2001) and OECD (2002).3
imperfect labour market
2. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the downward
sloping labour demand schedule and an upward sloping wage formation curve. It
shows that the wage formation curve is steeper for higher tax and benefit rates. This is
based on the following mechanism. As demand for labour increases, employers will
bid up real wages. The higher the tax rate, the higher will be the increase in the tax
bill for a given ex ante pay rise. Given that the labour market is tightening, workers
may be able to recover some of that extra tax from their employer via a real wage
increase on top of the initial “scarcity premium”. Thus, the higher the tax rate, the
more compensation workers will seek to obtain from their employer for a given ex
ante increase in employment and real wages.
3 To the extent benefits can be
considered as negative taxes (i.e. are means tested), this will prompt workers to seek
extra compensation to top up the scarcity premium as well. The higher the (initial)
benefit the larger this compensation will be and the steeper will be the wage formation
function.
The first panel of Figure 1 depicts an increase in the demand for labour, represented
by an outward shift of the labour demand schedule. With low taxes and benefits this is
shown to raise employment from L* to L1 and the real producer wage from w* to w1.
In order to obtain the same result in terms of after-tax wages if taxes and benefits are
higher, however, the real employer wage needs to increase by more, from w* to w2,
and employment would increase by less, from L* to L2. This implies that the deviation
of employment from the initial equilibrium is smaller. In line with the results of
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), the tax and benefit system thus operates as an
automatic stabiliser also on the labour market. 
However, the opposite holds in the case of a shock to labour supply. This is illustrated
in Figure 2, which shows that, following a negative supply shock – e.g., a wage push
following a rise in unionisation - taxes and benefits drive employment further away
                                                
2 Evidence of “real wage resistance” in continental Europe is found by Daveri and Tabellini (2000), but
not by Layard (1997) who finds that in the long-run tax neutrality holds. Notice, however, that what is
crucial for our analysis is real wage resistance in the short run. Hence the results below are not
incompatible with long run neutrality of taxes. In OECD (1990), a simple test based on time series
regressions of 16 OECD countries shows that while total taxes have no long run effects on labour costs,
they have a substantial short run. For an overview of the debate, see Carone and Salomäki (2001) and
Daveri (2001).
3 Note that this assumes that the government fails to provide such compensation via incomes policy.
This assumption is consistent with the starting point of our analysis that governments rely on automatic4
from the initial equilibrium. The higher the tax burden and the generosity of the
benefit system (i.e. the higher the marginal effective tax rate), the stronger the
destabilising effect.
































                                                                                                                                           
stabilisers, hence do not modify the tax and spending parameters in response to cyclical fluctuations in
economic activity.5
To convert these notions into a formal relationship we postulate the following wage
formation function:
(1) ) ( ) ( G T L f w − + = γ  
where w is the real producer wage, L is employment and T is the real revenue of
distorting tax per worker and G is the real (means-tested) benefit per worker. We
assume the first derivative of the function f with respect to L to be positive, in line
with the graphical representation in Figure 1. γ  is the coefficient of wage resistance: it
varies between 0 (all tax increases or benefit losses are borne by labour) and 1 (tax
increases or benefit losses are passed through entirely to employers). Rewriting in

















in which ρ = (df/dL)(L/f(L)) is the elasticity of the real wage with respect to (cyclical
variations in) employment. 
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= ′ . These are all positive, except for
the marginal benefit rate g' which is negative due to means testing.
By replacing t and t’ in (2) and defining the tax elasticity with respect to wage
earnings ξ t as the ratio between the marginal and average tax rate and ξ g as the ratio
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Equation (3) can be easily transformed into an output supply function of the Lucas-
Phillips type. In order to do so, we assume the nominal rate of change of the producer
wage to be equal the expected rate of inflation (π
e) plus the rate of change of the real
producer wage and that wages are fully passed into prices (i.e. 
e w π π + =  ). We
assume the ex ante tax and benefit rates t and g to be the same (i.e. in equilibrium
taxes are just sufficient to finance benefit expenditure, hence t = g). This is consistent6
also with the fiscal rule in EMU that the budget should be balanced over the cycle.
4
Finally, we assume that output supply is proportional to labour input. Under those
assumptions the output supply function becomes:
(4) ) ( ) 1 (
e t y π π ω γξ − − =
where ω and  g t ξ ξ ξ − =  are constant, positive parameters.
Hence, if there is some degree of wage resistance (i.e. γ  is positive), the reaction of
output to an inflation surprise is smaller the larger the value of t. In other words, in
countries with bigger governments and higher taxes, a value of inflation larger
(smaller) than expected will lead to a smaller (larger) reaction of output, which
corresponds to a steeper supply function in the output-inflation space. The intuition
for this result is clear. Take the case of a positive inflation surprise: as employers
demand more labour to increase production, they will have to pay higher wages to
cover not only for the higher prices but also on account of the fact that the real
production wage moves up; this tends to limit the rise in production.
5 
A progressive tax system (that is ξ t > 1) accentuates this effect, although it is not a
necessary condition for it to occur.
6 At first sight this contradicts the standard finding
in union-wage models that progressive taxation moderates wage claims because it
reduces the loss associated with a fall in wage income per worker without affecting
the gain in wage income associated with increased employment. However, these
models are based exclusively on the behaviour of unions, look only at taxation as
opposed to the tax and benefit system and ignore the impact of taxation and benefits
on search efforts, consumption-leisure trade-offs and efficiency wages. Taking these
mechanisms into account may be shown to change the sign of the impact of a
progressive tax and benefit system on wage claims from negative to positive (Naess-
Schmidt, 2003).
                                                
4 We assume furthermore that the tax and benefit system is neutral with respect to capital and labour,
i.e. exactly the same average and marginal rates apply to capital income and, for that matter, total value
added.
5 For this to hold true it must be assumed that governments fail to provide an offsetting tax break to
moderate wage demands, i.e. do not pursue an incomes policy. But this is consistent with the basic
assumption of our analysis: governments solely and fully rely on automatic stabilisers, hence do not
modify the tax and spending parameters in response to cyclical fluctuations in economic activity.
6 A sufficient condition is that ξ > 0, hence  ξt > ξg, i.e. the tax an benefit system as a whole is
redistributive.7
3. Taxation and stabilisation in a simple macroeconomic model
We now consider a version of the standard AD-AS model of a country belonging to a
monetary union which is closed vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
7 The IS aggregate
demand and Lucas-Phillips supply curves for the home country are written as:
(5) ()
d e d ε y π π i d y + − − − − = 4 3 2 1 φ φ φ φ
(6) ()
s e s t y ε π π ω γξ + − − = ) 1 (
where y is output, d is the budget deficit, π  is inflation (‘
e’ reads ‘expected’), i is the
nominal interest rate and t is the tax rate. y, d and t are expressed in terms of potential
(baseline) output. ε
d and ε
s represent, respectively, uncorrelated temporary demand
and supply shocks of zero mean. All the variables are percentage points deviations
with respect to the baseline. φ 1, φ 2,φ 3 are φ 4 are non-negative parameters. 
Equation (5) assumes that fluctuations in aggregate demand depend on (changes in)
the budget deficit, the real interest rate, competitiveness, absorption and a shock.
Equation (6) is equivalent to equation (4) with an exogenous shock term added.
Aggregate demand and supply equations are complemented with the policy rules
followed by the fiscal and monetary authorities. The central bank aims at stabilising
inflation and output of the currency area as a whole. We posit a simple Taylor rule of
the form:
(7) ) ( y i β απ λ + =
where λ  captures the weight of the domestic country in the currency area, and α  and β
are the preferences of the monetary authority over inflation and output, respectively.
For a conservative central banker, we have α>β . We assume that the monetary
authority sets interest rates so as to maintain inflation on a fixed target in the “medium
run”, which, in this simple setting, means in absence of shocks. Since shocks –
regardless of whether they are symmetric or country-specific – are serially
uncorrelated with zero average, this implies  0 =
e π . 
                                                
7 The more explicit microfoundations of the supply curve and the focus on a single country within a
monetary union are the main changes compared to the model in Buti et al. (2003a).8
For the fiscal authority, we assume that, in line with the Stability and Growth Pact, the
government pursues a neutral discretionary policy, which implies that it sets a target
for the structural budget balance and let automatic stabilisers play symmetrically over
the cycle
8. The deviation of the actual budget balance from the baseline (the latter
being structural balance in absence of shocks) is approximated by:
(8) ty gy ty d g t ξ ξ ξ − = − + − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 (
We capture the size of automatic stabilisers via the interaction of the elasticity ξ and
the parameter t, with the latter in equilibrium assumed to be equal to the government
expenditure ratio g. 
Equating (1) and (2), after substitution of equations (7) and (8) in (5) and (6), the
whole system can be solved for y and π :
(9) 
3 2 4 2 1
3 2
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We turn now to the analysis of shocks. We are interested in analysing the effects on
the degree of stabilisation in the event of shocks for different tax burdens t (or the
elasticity ξ : since the two terms enter in the expression as a product, the effect on the
response to shocks is the same). 
                                                
8  This is the definition of a well behaved” fiscal authority, according to Alesina et al. (2001).
For more sophisticated reaction functions of fiscal authorities in EMU, see, Buti, Roeger and in’t Veld
(2001) and Buti and Giudice (2002).9









































The standard model which neglects the effect of taxes and benefits on supply predicts
that automatic stabilisers stabilise output and inflation in the event of demand shocks
and stabilise output, but destabilise inflation under supply shocks (Blanchard, 2000,
Brunila, Buti and in’t Veld, 2002, and European Commission, 2001). In this standard
model, automatic stabilisers operate only on the demand side. Higher stabilisers imply
a lower effect of inflation on demand. In the output-inflation space, the aggregate
demand schedule is steeper and displays smaller shifts in the event of shocks. The
basic difference in our model is that, as stressed earlier, automatic stabilisers operate
not only on the demand side, but also on the supply side: higher stabilisers - which
means a higher level of taxes - make the supply schedule steeper.10
The left panel of Figure 3 pictures the case of a positive demand shock under a “low”
and “high” tax rate (or a low and high budget elasticity) according to the standard
model. The slope of the demand curve is higher (in absolute terms) with a high tax
rate than with a low one. The reason is that the higher the tax rate, the stronger will be
the cushioning effect of automatic stabilisers on demand after an economy has been
hit by rise in inflation. A rise in inflation will lead to a fall in demand on various
accounts, most prominently a weakening in international competitiveness, a decline in
real disposable income and a tightening of monetary policy. Note that the latter effect,
in an EMU context, is strongest in the largest economies whose weight in the central
bank's reaction function is biggest. Automatic stabilisers provide an offset, and hence
reduce the impact of inflation on demand and make the demand curve steeper. 
The initial equilibrium, E, corresponds to target levels of output (Y*) and inflation
(π *).
9 A positive demand shock induces a shift of the demand curve to the right.
10 The
new equilibrium points when only the steeper demand curve is considered (left panel)
are now at A with a low tax rate and at B with a high one. The new equilibrium level
of output is closer to the optimal level with a high tax rate than with a low one. A
similar picture emerges for inflation. Hence, in this case an increase in the tax rate is
both output and inflation stabilising.
Taking into consideration the possibility of the supply curve becoming steeper as
well, automatic stabilisation may become, however, inflation destabilising. From the
second panel in Figure 3, one can notice that this will still lead to a closer output to its
optimal level but to a higher inflation. Hence, in this case an increase in the tax rate
risks becoming inflation destabilising beyond a certain point if the slope of the supply
curve is more sensitive to the tax burden than the slope of the demand curve.
We turn now to the analysis of a supply shock. As shown in the left panel of Figure 4,
an adverse supply shock induces a shift of the supply curve to the left. The new
equilibrium point is now at A with a low tax burden and at B with a high tax rate. One
can easily notice that the new equilibrium level of output is further away from the
                                                
9  Notice that the initial equilibrium E is the same with low and high taxes only for reasons of
expositional convenience because we want to focus on the slope of the curves trather than their
position. 
10. Note that the horizontal shift is smaller for higher tax rates as the impact of the demand shock
is muted by the automatic stabilisers.11
initial level with a low tax rate  than with a high one. The reverse emerges for
inflation. Hence, in this case an increase in the tax rate from a low value to a high one
is output stabilising but inflation destabilising. 
The increase of the tax rate may become, however, output destabilising if the supply
curve also becomes steeper due to high taxation, as shown in the second panel of
Figure 4. The new equilibrium point is now at C with a high tax burden. It is clear
from the graph that the new equilibrium level of output is further away from the initial
level with a high tax rate than with a low one. Inflation is always further away from
its optimal level with a higher tax rate. Hence, in this case an increase in the tax rate
from a low value to a high one is both output destabilising and inflation destabilising. 
4. “Critical” levels of taxation 
The previous analysis shows that the changes of taxation to become output-
destabilising rise with the supply curve becoming steeper.
11 On the other hand, the
output destabilising-effect diminishes as the demand curve become steeper. Since the
slope of both curves depends on the tax rate, the threshold level for the tax rate
beyond which further increase of taxation is destabilising for output in the event of a
supply shock depends on the relative sensitivity of demand and supply to taxation.
This, in turn, depends on the openness of the economy: the more open the economy,
the lower will be the fiscal demand multiplier and therefore the steeper will be the
supply curve relative to the demand curve for a given tax burden. Therefore, open
economies are more likely to face adverse fiscal stabilisation properties in the face of
a supply shock than relatively closed economies for a given level of taxation (and
progressivity).
12 




y for a positive demand shock (
d ε >0) and
t ∂
∂ π > 0 for an adverse supply shock (
s ε <0). As was shown in the graphs in the
previous section, this implies that a higher t (or ξ ) unambiguously increases the
                                                
11 In the extreme case where the supply curve becomes vertical the shock would not be
smoothed at all and output would fall by the same extent of the supply shock.12
stabilisation of output in the event of demand shocks and destabilises inflation in the
event of a supply shock.
However, in the case of a response of output in the case of supply shocks or inflation
in the case of demand shocks, the initial level of t matters. In line with the intuition,
we show a higher t to entail stronger output stabilisation in the event of demand
shocks while it is inflation-destabilising in the event of demand shocks. The crucial
result concerns output-stabilisation in the event of a supply shock and inflation
stabilisation in the case of a demand shock. In the traditional model in which taxes do
not affect supply, higher taxes tend to stabilise both variables. In our model, instead,
there exists a threshold level of taxation beyond which a further increase in taxes has
perverse stabilisation effects.
We consider two concepts of the threshold tax level: the “optimal” t, call it t*, which
maximises output and inflation stabilisation in the event of supply and demand
shocks, respectively; and the “critical” t, call it t**, which corresponds to the level of
taxation resulting in zero fiscal stabilisation (i.e. the same level of stabilisation arising
when t=0).
t* is obtained by taking the derivative of the coefficient of ε d in π  or the coefficient of
ε s in  y to t and equating the result to zero:
(11)
γξ φ
γ φ λ β φ φ
1
4 2 1 *
2
) 1 ( + + −
= t
Hence, for t>t*, a rise in t reduces the degree of output stabilisation in the event of
supply shocks and inflation stabilisation in the event of demand shocks. 
t** is obtained by equating the coefficient of ε d in π  or the coefficient of ε s in y to the
same coefficient under t=0:
(12) 
γξ φ
γ φ λ β φ φ
1
4 2 1 * * ) 1 ( + + −
= t
So 
* * * 2t t = .
                                                                                                                                           
12 However, it should be recognised that, due to stronger competition, wage resistance is likely
to be smaller in more open economies. In our analysis, we do not consider this interaction.13
Some intuitively appealing conclusions can be drawn from this result:
•   First, it appears that there exists a trade-off between the redistributive thrust of the
tax and benefit system (ξ ) and the tax burden (t): the less redistributive taxes and
benefits are, the higher will be the critical tax rate, and hence the wider is the
range of tax rates whereby automatic stabilisers are effective. 
•   Second, the same applies to the degree of wage resistance (γ): the higher it is the
lower will be the optimal (and critical) tax rate, because the more the level and
redistributive thrust of taxation and spending matter for wage formation and hence
the bigger will be its impact through the supply channel.
•   Third, the threshold level of the tax rate above which automatic stabilisers become
destabilising depends on the responsiveness of demand to the fiscal impulses
stemming from the automatic stabilisers ( 1 φ ). The weaker this responsiveness
(e.g. because of Ricardian behaviour) the lower tax rate can be "afforded" without
risking declining or perverse stabilisation properties. 
•   Fourth, the threshold varies inversely with the weight of output stabilisation in the
central bank's reaction function (β). A dovish central bank will choke off the
output effect of automatic stabilisers and thus weaken their effectiveness.
Interestingly, this implies that the incentives to reform the tax and welfare system
are lower under a hawkish central banker
13, although incentives to reform the tax
system on efficiency grounds would obviously be decisive.
•   Fifth, a greater openness of the economy ( 4 φ ) reduces the threshold level of
taxation. The reason is that the demand effects of automatic stabilisers leak out via
foreign trade, implying that the negative supply effects predominate more quickly,
i.e. even at a lower level of taxation. This is analytically similar to the third point
above, but may be usefully highlighted separately. This is so because while trade
leakage is related to the openness of the economy, policy transmission may be
weak even in a closed economy. Open economies in the EMU are thus facing
stronger incentives to reform their tax systems than the relatively closed ones.
                                                
13 From a different perspective, this result is consistent with the view of those who see an expansionary
monetary policy going hand in hand with structural reforms. See, e.g. Bean (1998) and Saint-Paul
(2002).14
4. How large are t* and t**? Some numerical simulations
The typical tax burden in EMU countries is in the range of 40 to 50 per cent of GDP.
Is this exceeding the optimal level and would a reduction in the fiscal size thus work
out favourably for stabilisation? Is it empirically possible or even likely that the tax
burden exceeds the critical tax burden? 
While a fully-fledged analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper we can
nonetheless provide some tentative indication of the possible values of t* and t**. It
goes without saying that our computations are purely illustrative and that one should
refrain from drawing policy conclusions from the simple comparison of the estimated
t* and t** with the actual tax burden in euro-area economies. Nevertheless, these
estimates are helpful in exemplifying our reasoning.
In Table 1 we report the chosen baseline values of the coefficients. With regard to the
demand equation we assumed that  1 φ  = 1 and  2 φ  =  3 φ  = 4 φ  = ½, which is broadly in
line with the short-run elasticities reported in ready-reckoners of the OECD’s
INTERLINK model (Dalsgaard et al., 2001). The budget elasticity – encompassing
both spending and revenue - is set at ξ  = 1¼ based on Van den Noord (2000).  We
assume a hawkish banker, i.e. α = 1½ and β  = 0, with the country's weight in the
monetary policy reaction function set at λ = ¼. Concerning the supply equation we
assumed that ω = 3, which corresponds to the mid range of estimates of the price
elasticity of aggregate supply reported in Clarida et al. (1998).
14 To gauge the degree
of wage resistance we proceeded somewhat differently. Rather than making a prior
assumption for γ we fixed the incidence of labour taxation on profits at one half, i.e.
γ.ξ = ½. This implies that γ = 0.4. This is consistent with the evidence of Alesina and
Perotti (1997) which estimate a coefficient of 0.4 for countries in continental Europe
in the relation between labour taxes and unit labour costs in manufacturing in a
sample of annual data from 14 OECD countries. 
On the basis of these assumptions we find that t* = 0.4 and t** = 0.8, which suggests
that for countries in the upper end of the range the tax burden would be sub-optimal,
but well below the critical level (see Figure 5). This implies that a country with an15
initial tax burden of 50 per cent who would cut it by 10 percentage points realises a
slight improvement in the output stabilisation properties after an adverse supply
shock. The same holds true for the impact on prices after a positive demand shock.
Table 1 Baseline parameters
1 φ  = 1 ξ  = 1.25
2 φ  = 0.5 ω  = 3
3 φ  = 0.5 λ  = 0.25
4 φ  = 0.5 α = 1.5
γ  = 0.4 β  = 0
However, these results may be expected to be rather sensitive to the numerical
assumptions and hence, if this proves true, the structural features of the economies in
EMU. This is confirmed by sensitivity analysis. As shown in Table 2 and in the
corresponding figures in the Annex, a reduction in the budget elasticity from 1¼ to 1
raises the value of t* to 1/2 and t** to 1. In other words, a tax burden equal to one half
of GDP may still be optimal from a stabilisation point of view if the tax and benefit
system is proportional. By contrast, a greater openness of the economy ( 4 φ =¾), a less
effective fiscal policy ( 1 φ  = ¾) and greater wage resistance (γ = ½) all push t* into a
range of 0.2 to 0.3 and t** into a range of 0.4 to 0.6. Under those conditions slashing
the size of government would pay substantially in terms of the gains in fiscal
stabilisation properties that would be realised.
                                                                                                                                           
14 Note, however, that the value of ω , as well as those of  3 φ and α  , has no impact the t* and t**. Even
though they do affect the degree of fiscal stabilisation across levels of t, they are irrelevant for t* which
is obtained via the solution of the optimisation problem set out above. 16
Figure 5 Baseline simulation
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
(normalised at unity) on the output gap or inflation.
From Table 2 can be inferred that a similar scope for reductions in the size of
government results if the central banker turned dovish to an extent where it gives a
positive weight to output and inflation in its policy reaction function (β is set equal to
1). This effect is even more pronounced for larger countries who have a bigger weight
in the reaction function (for example λ = 1/2). Interestingly, this result runs somewhat
counter to the general perception that a hawkish central banker would be more
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Table 2 Sensitivity analysis
t* t**
Base line 0.4 0.8
ξ  = 1 0.5 1
β  = 1 0.35 0.7
4 φ  = 0.75 0.3 0.6
1 φ  = 0.75 0.2 0.4
γ  = 0.5 0.2 0.4
β  = 1, λ  = 0.5 0.3 0.6
Our results are broadly in line with recent empirical investigations which have found
evidence of a non linear relationship between the size of the government and
macroeconomic stability.
Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2003) test whether the structure of the tax system
affects the impact of tax changes on output volatility. In a sample of 25 OECD
countries over the period 1960-1999, they find that the composition of tax and
expenditure, in particular the tax mix, matters for output and price volatility:
distorting taxes, namely taxes on labour and capital, tend to have negative effects on
macroeconomic stability. Cuaresma, Reitschuler and Silgoner (2003) find that the
smoothing effect of fiscal stabilisers may revert at high levels. In a panel of 14 EU
countries over the period 1970-1999 the stabilising effect changes sign at a level of
government expenditure of about 38% of GDP. According to their results, for a
country displaying a public expenditure ratio around the median value of the
distribution (40.6% of GDP), an increase in spending by 1% point of GDP will raise
the standard deviation of output growth by 0.02 points. The destabilising effect is
higher (0.04%) for a country with an expenditure ratio of 44.1%. However, this study18
is not entirely comparable to ours as it focuses solely on government spending and
does not distinguish between automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy reactions. 
6. Conclusions
Conventional AD-AS models imply that high and progressive tax systems are
efficiency-decreasing but enhance output stabilisation in the event of shocks.
Progressive tax systems lead to a lower budget deficit (contraction of fiscal policy) in
good times, while the deficit would increase in recessions (fiscal expansion).
Moreover, large and progressive tax systems usually go hand in hand with more
generous systems of social protection. Although social benefit programmes mainly
have an equity role, as well as potential efficiency effects when they correct market
failures, most of them also act as automatic stabilisers. Unemployment benefits make
up the clearest example, but more generally the relative robustness of expenditure
programmes to cyclical fluctuations serves to smooth economic activity, and this
smoothing effect is likely to increase with the size of government. However, since
distorting taxes and benefits have a pervasive impact on potential growth, a trade-off
between stabilisation and efficiency seems to arise within the standard AD-AS
framework. If there is a positive relationship between the size of automatic stabilisers
and distortive taxation, any tax reform aiming at lowering distortions and enhancing
efficiency will come at the expense of macroeconomic stability. 
This issue is at the heart of macroeconomic policy design in EMU. If, as suggested by
the standard model, there were a trade off between stability and flexibility, EMU
members — having given up national monetary independence — would not dispose
of enough policy instruments to deal with idiosyncratic shocks. 
However, this paper suggests that, in the event of supply shocks, such a trade-off
might not exist. Within our model, under the assumption of at least partial wage
resistance, cutting tax rates reduces market distortions and enhances the output
stabilisation in the event of supply shocks and inflation stabilisation in the event of
demand shocks. So, if our conclusions are right, unless there is a clear predominance
of demand over supply shocks, one should not worry about the possible adverse
effects on stabilisation of the tax reforms that across the EU are lowering marginal19
and average tax rates across the whole income scale (European Commission 2000a
and b, 2001). 
It goes without saying that the analysis in this paper is only a first step into the
analysis of the relations between efficiency and flexibility, on the one hand, and
cyclical stabilisation, on the other hand. Obvious improvements concern the
theoretical model (which is overly simple and static in nature) and the description of
the behaviour of policy makers. Moreover, the numerical simulations are only
indicative and should be supplemented by more thorough econometric investigation. 
An issue that arises naturally is the apparent contradiction between our conclusion
that adverse stabilisation effects may arise at lower levels of taxation in smaller
economies and the finding that small, open economies tend to have larger
governments (see the seminal contribution by Rodrick (1998), and, recently,
Martinez-Mongay (2002)). Two explanations can be offered. First, whatever their
initial level, higher taxes are output-stabilising in the event of demand shocks. Hence,
if output stabilisation is the main goal of fiscal authorities and demand shocks (are
expected to) prevail, larger governments would ensue. However, EMU may bring a
change in the composition of shocks by increasing the relative frequency of supply
compared to demand shocks.
15 If so, large automatic stabilisers may no longer be
optimal. Second, to the extent the tax burden remains below the critical tax burden, a
rise in it is stabilising, although increasingly less so. This, coupled with a higher
exposure to shocks, may imply larger governments in small open economies.
Econometric analyses based on past data may capture this effect. However, in recent
years, the actual tax burden may have reached or even exceeded the critical one.
Fresh empirical evidence tend to lend support to our results.
Our analysis indicates that tax reforms aiming at lowering marginal effective tax rates and the
tax burden, under supply shocks, may enhance the stabilisation properties of automatic
stabilisers, especially in small euro area economies. Hence they face a lesser dilemma
between structural reform and stabilisation policy. This may contribute to explain their greater
reform efforts and better performance compared with the big “laggards”. However, if EMU
                                                
15 Buti, Pench and Sestito (1999) argue that EMU’s macroeconomic framework could lead to
less policy-induced demand shocks while the increase in market competition brought about by the euro
could entail more supply-related shocks. 20
brings about greater trade integration, the incentives to step up reform efforts would increase
also in the large euro area countries. 
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Annex: sensitivity analysis
ξ  = 1
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
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Sensitivity analysis (continued)
β  = 1
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
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Sensitivity analysis (continued)
4 φ  = 0.75
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
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Sensitivity analysis (continued)
1 φ  = 0.75
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
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Sensitivity analysis (continued)
γ  = 0.5
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
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Sensitivity analysis (continued)
β  = 1, λ  = 0.5
Note: the horizontal axes indicate the tax burden (t) and the vertical axes the impact of a shock
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